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Abstract: Environmental politics has become inextricably entwined with planetary deep time. This 
article calls for a reconceptualization of the relation between humans and nonhuman nature. It rejects 
the ontological singularity of the human, either as a biological species (homo) or as a planetary super-
agent (Anthropos) and argues for a perspective centred on companionship and shared vulnerability. 
Animal philosophy serves here to counter a growing tendency to generalise and address the human 
species at large, in the singular. The cultural force of the animal, it is suggested, stems from a 
productive tension between the abstract singular (“the Animal”) and the unique specificity of each 
particular nonhuman other. In the context of Anthropocene studies, references to Anthropos follow a 
similar logic. The planetary future of humans cannot be deduced from any specific geopolitical context 
or expressed through universalizing categories. It must be understood, against the vertiginous backdrop 
of geological time, as a process of becoming: a complex set of material and semiotic practices shaping 
open-ended, transformative trajectories. 
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Friend, said the Rat, listen to me.  
You called Earth, now Earth is speaking. 




Over the past eighteen years, the concept of the Anthropocene – first proposed 
by atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen and ecologist Eugene Stoermer – has 
developed a cultural life of its own.3 The idea that Earth left its most recent 
geological epoch, the Holocene, as a consequence of human action, is widely 
discussed and has reverberated powerfully across the arts, humanities and social 
sciences, inspiring debates, publications and works of art. Earth scientists have 
paid growing attention to political, economic, social and cultural structures, in a 
manner that cuts across established disciplinary boundaries and calls for a 
reconceptualization of the relation between humans and nonhuman nature. 
Similarly, many social scientists, philosophers and cultural critics have shifted 
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the focus of their inquiries towards natural processes and forms – climate 
patterns, drought zones, glacier flows, loss of species and so on – that are 
affected by human activities and impinge upon them.4 As Jussi Parikka explains, 
the concept of the Anthropocene is perceived by a growing number of scholars as 
a challenge to the traditional humanities but also as “a useful trigger for a variety 
of approaches that are interested in the nonhuman and post-human”.5 Beyond 
the specific expertise of earth scientists, the Anthropocene has become an 
important staging ground for controversies about environmental justice, the 
future of global capitalism and the political, economic and cultural causes and 
consequences of population growth, climate change and species loss.6  
 
There is, of course, nothing new about the claim that human activity interferes 
with the forces of the natural world, and is guided and constrained by its 
processes.  Since its earliest origins, the idea of human civilization – in its 
manifold historical and cultural declinations – has been virtually synonymous 
with the “cultivation” of nature, imagined either in terms of pious stewardship or 
as ruthless conquest.7 Long before the advent of modern industrialisation, 
ecologists warned against the devastating consequences of anthropocentric 
cultural and material practices, from agriculture and deforestation to the 
pollution caused by large urban centres. Since the turn of the Twentieth Century, 
environmentalist movements in North America and Western Europe have 
agitated against exploitative, growth-driven techno-industrialism and have 
sought alternative forms of social organization, in harmony with other species. 
More recently, environmental justice has become a major political concern in the 
global South, where eco-activists defend local (multispecies) communities and 
the importance of locally embedded traditions, frequently against the interest of 
international actors and the nation state.8 Modern ecological thinking, as 
historians of environmentalism have shown, emerged fully in the 1960s and 
1970s, but had its ideological roots in much earlier movements, including British 
and German Romanticism.9 Its long temporal trajectory also reaches into our 
present, where ecological thinking continues to shape debates about the 
Anthropocene.10 James Lovelock’s “Gaia Hypothesis”, for example, has enjoyed a 
surprising second life in the growing literature about the Anthropocene, thanks 
 3 
to the interest of leading contemporary thinkers such as Donna Haraway, Bruno 
Latour and Isabelle Stengers. Once hailed as a doyen of environmentalism, 
Lovelock has intervened in recent debates to address the relevance of his early 
work to an age of rapidly unfolding, global ecological catastrophe.11 In this 
context, much attention has focused on the British geophysicist’s most well-
known claim that Earth (“Gaia”) functions as a self-regulating and evolving, 
complex system: “an opera […] that has neither a score nor an ending, and is 
never performed twice on the same stage”, in Bruno Latour’s words.12  
 
While the burgeoning environmentalist movements of the Seventies associated 
Gaia with notions of global harmony, vulnerability and maternal care, 
discussions of Lovelock’s theory have since acquired a more menacing 
overtone.13 The advent of large-scale and potentially catastrophic climate 
change, according to Lovelock and his interlocutors, alerts us to the fact that the 
Earth System, at the dawn of the Anthropocene, has become more inscrutable, 
more difficult to control, and less suitable for the flourishing of human 
populations. In contemporary discussions, this condition is often expressed in a 
metaphorical language of conflict, which – like the environmentalism of the 
Seventies – draws inspiration from the anthropomorphic name that was 
suggested to Lovelock by the novelist William Golding. “Gaia”, it has been 
claimed, is “fighting back” or “seeking revenge”, or, in the words of philosopher 
Clive Hamilton, is engaged in a “power struggle” with humankind, and 
“attempting to pull us into its domain”.14 Other theorists have employed 
different, but similarly drastic metaphors. “Even if the human species manages to 
reduce its ecological footprint drastically”, warn historians Christophe Bonneuil 
and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, “we will not have settled our accounts with Gaia”.15 
Focusing on metaphors of intrusion rather than violent conflict or debt, Isabelle 
Stengers describes Gaia as a fearful and devastating power that encroaches on 
numerous kinds and species – including homo sapiens – and threatens their 
survival.16 Similarly, for Donna Haraway, “Gaia does not and could not care about 
human or other biological beings’ intentions or desires or needs, but Gaia puts 
into question our very existence, we who have provoked its brutal mutation”.17 
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Despite Lovelock’s influence, the relationship between twentieth-century 
environmentalism and Anthropocene thinking remains a point of controversy.  
For philosopher Clive Hamilton, ecological thinking must be superseded and 
replaced by what he labels Earth System thinking: a new transdisciplinary and 
integrative approach, which assimilates the traditional earth sciences and life 
sciences. Unlike ecology, which studies the connections between organisms and 
species in a shared environment, Earth System thinking shifts the focus away 
from local and regional specificity and towards interconnected planetary cycles 
and forces. As Hamilton explains, “the Anthropocene is emphatically not a new 
name for a more intense phase of human disturbance of local and regional 
ecosystems” but captures “the qualitative leap from disturbances of ecosystems 
to disruption of the Earth System”.18 In his most recent monograph, Defiant 
Earth: The Fate of Humans in the Anthropocene (2017), the Australian 
philosopher builds on this idea to sketch the outlines of what he describes as a 
New Anthropocentrism: a fresh political and cultural awareness of humanity’s 
dangerous, exponentially growing powers and a critical engagement with our 
ability to alter and shape planetary processes. New Anthropocentrism, for 
Hamilton, is explicitly anti-humanist and runs counter to more familiar forms of 
normative anthropocentrism (humans are destined to be the planet’s dominant 
creature) or techno-supremacism. According to the author of Defiant Earth, the 
Anthropocene marks a rupture in planetary history since, under its new 
conditions, the future of the planet and the life it supports are inexorably 
dependent on human agency. Humans find themselves at the centre of the Earth 
System, whether we like it or not. Anthropos, for Hamilton, has become a 
“planetary super-agent” (133), but “it” [sic] remains embedded in nonhuman 
nature and constrained by its processes: “a knot in the fabric of nature” (52; 
author’s italics). In the context of an increasingly dangerous and unstable Earth 
System, Hamilton’s New Anthropocentrism thus acquires a pervasively tragic 
connotation: as a species, we are gaining awareness of the fatal consequences of 
our collective errors (hamartia), just as our established social, scientific and 
moral paradigms are rendered obsolete by Gaia’s growing hostility and 
unpredictability. 
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Hamilton’s dual critique of traditional, normative anthropocentrism and global 
capitalism – “monstrous anthropocentrism” in Hamilton’s words – shares some 
important similarities with ecological thinking (43). Like many strands of 
Posthumanism, New Anthropocentrism rejects the abstract, interchangeable, 
autonomous individual of liberal moral-political theory and urges us to stretch 
the limits of our imagination towards a new sense of planetary responsibility. 
Earth is viewed, in both contexts, as a single, shared habitat: not a mere 
backdrop or context for human action, but a constitutive and active presence 
that must be included in all our deliberations. Despite these important 
similarities, however, Hamilton frames his considerations as a critique of 
environmentalism, especially with regard to two central points. First, he defends 
the ontological singularity of the human, not as a biological species (homo) but 
as a planetary super-agent (anthropos). Secondly, he argues that exclusive 
attention to geochronology must replace the socio-economic and cultural focus 
of traditional historiography. For Hamilton, “the natural world inherited by 
modernity is gone, and all of the ideas built on it now float on its memory” (38). 
In the context of Defiant Earth, this applies not only to the apologists of 
predatory capitalism, but to anybody who continues to pay attention to patterns 
of social and economic inequality. What is required, according to Hamilton, is not 
a more nuanced socio-political critique of the period from around 1945 – 
notoriously described by Paul Crutzen as the “Great Acceleration” – but an 
entirely new, mythopoetic account of humanity’s tragic ascendency to 
unprecedented levels of protean, planetary power: “a story penned by 
geohistorians, attempting to tell the story of powerful beings soon to be 
overwhelmed by more powerful forces” (128). Questions of regional inequality 
or specific political responsibility, the Australian philosopher contends, are 
ultimately of secondary importance.  
 
Hamilton’s polemic, it appears, is specifically directed against left-wing thinkers 
like sociologist Jason Moore, who view climate change as a product of late 
capitalist industrial civilization – the “Capitalocene” – and who claim that the 
threat of global environmental catastrophe cannot be tackled independently 
from the inequalities and violence inscribed in the current global political and 
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economic order.19 Versions of this idea are popular among environmental 
activists, climate justice movements and postcolonial theorists, and have also 
inspired Donna Haraway’s “Chthulucene”: a neologism that seeks to highlight the 
political violence inherent in any anthropocentric thought system.20 As the North 
American feminist has stressed in a recent contribution, “outrages meriting 
names like Anthropocene or Capitalocene are about socio-ecologically, 
historically situated human beings (not humankind all the time everywhere) 
destroying places and times of refuge for people and other critters”.21  
 
Hamilton’s disagreement with Haraway and Moore is apparent, but his vision of 
two allegedly antagonistic and ideologically opposed camps – Posthumanism vs. 
New Anthropocentrism – misrepresents the cross-disciplinary openness of 
Anthropocene Studies. While Hamilton views human historiography per se as a 
misrepresentation of the advent of the new geological epoch, other scholars have 
called for a dual, historical and geological perspective, based on knowledge 
exchange, dialogue and cross-disciplinary inquiry.22 A recent project led by 
climatologists Simon Lewis and Mark Maslin, for example, defines the 
Anthropocene in relation to the complex environmental changes brought about 
by colonialism and transcontinental trade, especially at the level of introduced 
diseases, species exchange and forced human migration.23 In a different but 
related attempt to mark historical specificity, archaeologists Jon Erlandson and 
Todd Braje have dated the beginnings of the Anthropocene back to the 
domestication of plants and animals, some 10.000 years ago.24 Like Haraway’s 
and Moore’s critique of the Anthopocene, these projects signal a wider need to 
resist what historians Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz have 
labelled the “geocratic grand narrative of the Anthropocene”, or rather, the claim 
that geochronology naturalizes and depoliticizes human history, and ultimately 
renders it irrelevant.25  
 
When earth scientists discuss the human impact on Earth as a single, interlocked 
feedback system, they often turn their attention to deep time and the distant 
future. From a strictly stratigraphic point of view, the nuclear explosions of 1945 
are perhaps the sharpest marker of human interference, since the sudden 
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deposition of radionuclides across the Earth’s surface will be easy to detect in 
the rock record even a hundred million years hence.26 The rapid increase in the 
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, however, is likely to have 
much greater effects on the future of Earth, that are also less easy to predict. 
Other human activities, such as large reservoirs, megacities, deforestation and 
soil erosion will also affect Earth over a time-scale of several thousand years – 
and therefore, in all likelihood, long after the end of human history. In light of all 
this, it is hard to concur with Hamilton’s claim that a detailed knowledge of 
political, economic and social history is irrelevant to our understanding of the 
Anthropocene. Traditional Earth history does not focus on homo sapiens, which 
has walked the planet for a trifling 200,000 years, but when it comes to the 
Anthropocene, historical and geopolitical factors, including class, ethnicity and 
gender, must be taken into account. In this context, the political responsibility of 
social scientists and scholars in the arts and humanities, as Bonneuil and Fressoz 
point out, consists in fostering a sense of historical and cultural specificity: “To 
forget past reflections and understandings, struggles and defeats, illusions and 
mistakes, would mean losing an experience that is precious for the present 
challenges”.27  
 
Human-Animal Studies, I suggest, provides a suitable framework for these 
discussions. Animal philosophy – in the tradition of Gilles Deleuze, Jacques 
Derrida and Donna Haraway – has long explored and critiqued the connection 
between anthropocentrism and biopolitical atrocity. As Rosi Braidotti explains, 
the animal has featured prominently in the long cultural history of the West, 
indexing the European subject’s relation to otherness:  
 
The metaphysics of otherness rested on an assumed political anatomy, 
implicitly modelled on ideals of whiteness, masculinity, normality, youth, 
and health. All other modes of embodiment, in the sense of both 
dialectical otherness (nonwhite, nonmasculine, nonnormal, nonyoung, 
nonhealthy) and categorical otherness (zoomorphic, disabled, or 
malformed), were pathologized and cast on the other side of normality – 
that is, viewed as anomalous, deviant, and monstrous. This morphological 
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normativity was inherently anthropocentric, gendered, and racialized. It 
confirmed the dominant subject as much in what he included as his core 
characteristics as in what he excluded as other.28 
 
In his influential long essay, The Animal That Therefore I Am (2008), Jacques 
Derrida makes a similar point when he describes the “carnophallogocentric” 
character of European philosophy and modern, industrialised civilization. 
Twenty-first-century humans, writes Derrida, are no less dependent upon 
animal products than their ancestors in the eighteenth century. Indeed, our 
dependence has extended to demographic level unknown in the past, and to new 
fields: the industrial production of animal meat for consumption, biomedical 
research, more and more audacious manipulations of the genome, and so on. 
These contemporary uses of animals, however, are increasingly invisible. 
Animals are hidden away in laboratories and factory farms, slaughtered at mass 
disassembly plants and transformed into sanitised packages of meat: “visible in 
mediated form, but largely absent from our daily lives”, in Shirley Vint’s words.29 
The deplorable conditions of non-human animals, as Derrida drily remarks, are 
“all too well known”, yet they must be hidden from our view, since we could not 
otherwise endure their immense suffering.30 For there can be no doubt, as 
Derrida points out, that the oppressive social order premised on animal suffering 
is unbearable, that it runs counter to our most basic and innate sense of a 
meaningful existence: “the human well-being of man” (25).  
 
Considered from a moral standpoint, anthropocentrism, for Derrida, is above all 
a failure of the imagination. Human exceptionalism – the belief that humans are 
essentially different from all other species –  is a dogmatic slumber, that makes 
us oblivious to the demands of biosocial kinship, which for the French 
philosopher find their most articulate expression in Jeremy Bentham’s 
reflections on the suffering of animals:  
 
The response to [Bentham’s] question “Can they suffer?” leaves no room 
for doubt. In fact, it has never left any room for doubt; that is why the 
experience that we have of it is not even indubitable; it precedes the 
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indubitable, it is older than it. No doubt either, then, of there being within 
us the possibility of giving vent to a surge of compassion, even if it is the 
misunderstood, or denied, held at bay (28).  
 
Exceptionalist ideologies, Derrida contends, obscure the scandalous reality of 
animal suffering in research labs and in the food production system, but they 
also blind us to the unquestionable reality of biosocial compassion, and thus 
erase the possibility of human flourishing. Our daily violence towards animals, 
premised on ideas of humanity’s superior moral status, blocks any possibility of 
compassionate reciprocity, forgiveness, reconciliation and spiritual peace.          
 
To make sense of the real presence of animals in our lives, Derrida contends, we 
must think beyond the pseudo-concept of “the Animal”, used in the singular, as 
though all nonhuman species from the oyster to the chimpanzee constituted a 
homogenous set to which human beings are radically opposed. “The Animal”, for 
Derrida, epitomizes our species’ carnophallogocentric desire for mastery, which 
he claims is embraced and taken for granted by Western philosophers from 
Aristotle to Heidegger. As Aaron Gross intimates: “When the reality of animals 
becomes ‘the animal’ – that is, a foil and shadow of the human – an opportunity 
arises, which may or may not be actualized, to forget animals themselves”.31 For 
Derrida, this potential “absenting of animals” – our actual, existing fellow 
creatures – finds its logical and moral counterpoint in a utopian desire for the 
absence of “the Animal”, understood as an abstract category. At a lexical level, 
this utopian longing is marked by Derrida’s neologism animot: a word which, 
when spoken in French, recalls the extreme diversity of actual animals (animaux) 
that the abstract category erases, but that also makes us aware, in a typically 
Derridean shift of signification, that we inevitably depend on the abstract 
singular (Animal) which is nothing more, precisely, than a word (mot). As 
philosopher Andrew Benjamin has pointed out, the tension between universality 
and particularity cannot be resolved, but must be understood as a productive 
tension for narrative and the figurative arts: the abstract singular threatens to 
erase the particular, but it is also threatened by particularity: “the actual 
existence of those figured”.32  
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Derrida’s robust critique of carnophallogocentric philosophy echoes profoundly 
in contemporary human-animal studies, through the works of influential 
thinkers such as Ralph Acampora, Matthew Calarco, Kelly Oliver and Cary Wolfe, 
among others. This influx of new voices and visions, across disciplines, has 
profoundly altered our understanding of animal welfare, moving away from the 
notion of animal rights – in the analytic tradition of Peter Singer, Mary Midgley 
and others – and towards a new idiom centred on companionship, shared 
vulnerability and a sense of humanity that is always established in relation to 
animality. In the context of Anthropocene studies, this tradition may now serve, 
as Ursula Heise and others have suggested, to counter a growing tendency 
among commentators to generalise and address the human species at large, in 
the singular:  
 
This conceptual move tends to come easily to natural scientists, who often 
lump all humans together so as to highlight their differences from or 
interactions with other species and natural environments. It is a much 
more difficult move for social scientists and humanists, to whom 
historical, social, and cultural differences between communities tend to 
stand out much more sharply.33 
 
Historians, social scientists and scholars in the environmental humanities, 
according to Heise, are well placed to interrogate seemingly unproblematic 
references to humanity in Anthropocene discourse. William Connolly, in Facing 
the Planetary: Entangled Humanism and the Politics of Swarming, (2017), concurs 
with this idea. “I oppose any sense of generic human responsibility for the 
contemporary planetary condition”, explains Connolly. “Generic responsibility 
must be replaced by regionally distributed responsibilities and vulnerabilities” 
and the role of the scholar, in this respect, must be “to face the planetary while 
connecting that face to regional, racial, and urban issues with which it is 
imbricated”.34 Scholars in the humanities, he argues, must engage with the 
specific expertise of geologists, glaciologists, climatologists, and palaeontologists, 
in a broad merger of intellectual and political efforts. This mutual partaking in 
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specific areas of disciplinary knowledge, however, must not be imagined as a 
one-way process, but needs to be understood, according to Connolly, as a form of 
entanglement: “The preciousness of classical humanism must be challenged by 
what I call entangled humanism”.35 Similarly, Stacy Alaimo has acknowledged the 
need to address human responsibility on a vast and predominantly geological, 
temporal and spatial scale, but has warned that this must not stand in the way of 
swift political action, in response to environmental degradation. Citing the case 
of the deep sea, Alaimo calls for a scholarly perspective that beholds both the 
expansiveness of geological time and the “eerie temporal compression” of 
anthropogenic climate change, and that acknowledges the resultant devastation 
of species, habitats and entire ecosystems:  
 
Whereas the ability to stand back and map vast terrains—the already 
emblematic epistemological stance of the Anthropocene—places Man 
outside of that which he surveys, the compressed time of the 
Anthropocene seas puts us under pressure, weighs us down with the 
recognition that even as human impacts may be colossal, human 
understanding of marine ecologies and species, especially those of the 
deep seas, is miniscule.36 
 
This sense of humility, as Michelle Niemann has shown, constitutes an 
increasingly important paradigm for scholars in the environmental humanities, 
and links their efforts to earlier work by environmental activists and ecocritics.37  
 
I have argued that the cultural force of the animal stems from a productive 
tension between the abstract singular (“the Animal”) and the unique specificity 
of each particular nonhuman other. Exclusive attention to either phenomena, 
according to Derrida, would be inevitably reductive. In the context of 
Anthropocene studies, references to the human follow a similar logic. If we treat 
Anthropos as an abstract singular (“the Human”), historical and geopolitical 
distinctions risk to disappear from sight, as do differences of class, ethnicity and 
gender. By contrast, if we focus our attention on specific historical events, we 
may fail to grasp the vertiginous scale of what Hamilton calls the “rupture in the 
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functioning of the Earth System”.38 In order to engage with both temporal levels 
– history and planetary deep time – we must envisage the human, similarly to the 
animal, as a figuration: a complex set of material and semiotic practices, whose 
open-ended, transformative trajectories cannot be fully addressed through 
universalizing categories. The cultural force of the animal is only partly located 
in any specific nonhuman other, and accrues power and value across multiple 
figurations. Similarly, the planetary future of Anthropos cannot be deduced from 
any particular geopolitical context, and must be understood as a process of 
becoming. Derrida’s metaphorical description of human-animal relations as a 
“war for compassion”, which I now turn to, offers an interesting illustration of 
this idea. 
 
For two centuries, Derrida writes, we have been at war: a war waged by homo 
sapiens against other species, but also “between, on the one hand, those who 
violate not only animal life but even and also this sentiment of compassion, and, 
on the other hand, those who appeal for an irrefutable testimony to this pity”.39 
This long war, Derrida surmises, “is probably ageless but, and here is my 
hypothesis, it is passing through a critical phase”.40 In the context of 
Anthropocene studies, Derrida’s allusions to an escalating conflict recall 
concerns about biodiversity and the potential collapse of important ecosystems. 
Extinction rates have grown disproportionately in recent decades, as a result of 
habitat destruction, invasive species, pollution, human population growth and 
overharvesting. Evolutionary biologists have warned that a mass extinction of 
species – only the sixth to occur in the 3.5 billion years of life on Earth – may be 
taking place in our age, as a result of human activities. As Ursula Heise explains, 
conservationists have struggled to convey this development to non-specialist 
audiences, whose compassionate interest is triggered mainly by large, vaguely 
anthropomorphic mammals: “flagship species” or “charismatic megafauna”.41 
Derrida, by contrast, focuses his attention on domestic animals and factory 
farming, but opts for a similarly melodramatic register. As historian Aaron Gross 
explains, “it would be a mistake to take Derrida’s use of the word war as strictly 
metaphorical.  Like the conventional use of the term war, it signals an immense 
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mobilization of resources, social (local, regional, national, global) planning, an 
intensified use of technologies, destruction of environments, and mass killing”.42  
 
At the most literal level, the French philosopher’s idea of a never-ending war 
between species brings to mind narratives like the Planet of the Apes series 
(since 1968) or Günther Grass’ dark and exhilarating Die Rättin [The Rat, 1986] 
in which the eponymous rodents trigger a nuclear war that entirely wipes out 
homo sapiens. As Sheryll Vint has shown, many works of apocalyptic science 
fiction imagine “a recurrence of war with fellow creatures, human and non-
human; the threat of human annihilation and a vision – sometimes fearful, 
sometimes optimistic – about another species replacing us as the dominant form 
of life”.43 More frequently still, animals feature in the aftermath of imagined man-
made catastrophes, as inhabitants and symbols of a post-apocalyptic “world 
without us” – a tradition that goes back to Richard Jeffrey’s Darwinian neo-feudal 
romance After London or Wild England (1885) and that spans languages and 
cultures. Italian readers, for example, may find compelling examples of the genre 
in Guido Morselli’s Dissipatio H.G [Dissipatio H.G., 1977], Paolo Volponi’s Il 
pianeta irritabile [Irritable Planet, 1978] and Carlo Cassola’s Il superstite [The 
Survivor, 1978]. More widely known instances of the same trope may be found in 
Terry Gilliam’s Twelve Monkeys (1995), where a lion and a bear are seen roaming 
the ruins of a post-apocalyptic Manhattan, or in the most recent, third cinematic 
adaptation of Richard Mathewson’s I am Legend (1954): a film of the same title 
(2007), directed by Francis Lawrence, which includes scenes of a solitary dear-
hunt, again, in what used to be the cultural and financial centre of New York 
 
Elegiac or melodramatic narratives of extinction, according to Heise, foster a 
nostalgic and pessimistic attitude, which is also increasingly common among 
conservationists. Two and a half decades after the Rio Earth Summit, most 
researchers and environmental activists concur that we can no longer prevent 
the catastrophic consequences of anthropogenic climate change, but can only 
hope to limit its pace and extent, and seek to adjust to the new conditions.44 
Some have argued that we must learn to let go of certain species and 
ecosystems.45 As Donna Haraway points out, it has become difficult to maintain 
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any hope for the future, or to perpetuate individual or collective efforts to 
improve the lives of human and nonhuman others. A “game-over attitude” 
appears sadly appropriate and yet, Haraway contends, “there is a fine line 
between acknowledging the extent and seriousness of the troubles and 
succumbing to abstract futurism and its affects of sublime despair and its politics 
of sublime indifference”.46 So does Derrida’s bleak vision of a never-ending 
conflict between species strike the right balance between naïve hope and 
paralysing despair?       
 
Our answer here depends crucially on the deliberate ambivalence of Derrida’s 
formulation. The war between species, he claims, is “probably ageless”: a conflict 
as old as the human indifference towards other animals.47 Yet Derrida’s never-
ending war is not merely (and not primarily) a conflict between species. Indeed, 
such a reductive reading would return us, precisely, to the state of dogmatic 
blindness which the neologism animot seeks to disrupt. The apparent Manichean 
symmetry of Derrida’s metaphor, then, dissolves into a powerful, albeit 
enigmatic demand for care, that unhinges abstract notions of alterity and 
sameness, premised on human exceptionalism. The war between species, 
Derrida claims, is ultimately a struggle against those who violate “the sentiment 
of compassion”.  
 
Can the war between species ever come to an end? Derrida’s critique of 
carnophallogocentrism exposes the inherent contradictions of any desire for 
conceptual purity, arguing that species identity is always predicated on 
difference. For the French philosopher, the abstract singular (“the Animal”) is 
meaningless without the heterogeneous multiplicity of the living, just as the 
specific nonhuman other cannot be fully grasped in the absence of general 
categories. The relation between animal life and the so-called human, writes 
Derrida is “at once intertwined and abyssal, and they can never be totally 
objectified”.48 With a slight shift of theoretical perspective, we can give a 
different meaning to Derrida’s extended metaphor. Thinking beyond the logic of 
aporia, I suggest that the conflict between species can be put to rest, pace 
Derrida, by a radical reshaping of the human-animal bond. If we relinquish the 
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tragic temporality of Derrida’s war (or Hamilton’s struggle with Gaia) in favour 
of new forms of posthuman vitality, we may find that biology itself offers a 
radical alternative to anthropocentrism. Our most radical hope for the future, 
according to this view, lies not in an imagined apocalyptic closure but in the 
perpetual self-transformation of life in all its forms: a force which transcends all 
existing social categories, boundaries and limits, and opens up our personal, 
social and cultural existence to endless becoming. 
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